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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
)

BARBARA McWILLIAMS,
MICHAEL McWILLIAMS,
RANDALL McWILLIAMS,
TIMOTHY McWILLIAMS,
and LORE McWILLIAMS,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
OLYMPIA SALES COMPANY,
a corporation, and the
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Defend ants and

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.
11043

)
)
)

Respondents,~

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Comes now BARBARA McWILLIAMS, one of
the plaintiffs herein, and respectfully petitions this
Honorable Court for a rehearing in the above entitled
case.
This petition is based on the following grounds:
POINT I
THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THE COURT IS BASED
UPON A MISUNDERSTANDING AND MISCONCEPTION
OF THE FACTS.
POINT II
THERE IS A TOTAL ABSENCE OF FACTS TO SUP- 1-

PORT THE FINDINGS OF THE MEDICAL PANELS
AND OF THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION.
POINT III
THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE OF
RES JUDICATA.
POINT IV
THE COURT THE 2ND MEDICAL PANEL AND THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION BASED THEIR DECISION
IN PART ON THE OPINION OF A DISQUALIFIED
MEDICAL PANEL.
ROBERTS AND POOLE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
POINT I
THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THE COURT IS BASED
UPON A MISUNDERSTANDING AND MIXCONCEPTION
OF THE FACTS.
POINT II
THERE IS A TOTAL ABSENCE OF FACTS TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE MEDICAL PANELS
AND OF THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION.

In the Court's statement of the factual situation
of this cas~ the following statement is

made in the

opening paragraph of the Majority Opinion:
"Some seven months after his fall the decedent developed an irregularity in his
heart beat and had a pacemaker surgi-2-

cally implanted in his body ... "
The facts of this case are that the irregularity in the
heartbeat first manifested itself immediately after the
fall as evidenced by the electrocardiogram administered to McWilliams on the same day as the fall.
Prior to the fall there was no evidence of any kind that
McWilliams had ever suffered from heart malfunction
or that he had had any of the symptoms of heart disease.

Any conclusions that McWilliams was ill or

had a heart malfunction of any kind preceding the fall
has to be based upon pure speculation and must ignore
the abundance of evidence in the record to the contrary.
It is apparent from the Panel reports that the doctors

constituting the medical panel were unable to determine
the cause of McWilliams' heart disability from a medical standpoint and speculated that he must have had
pre-existing disability. There are no facts to support
this conclusion.
the contrary.

There is an abundance of facts to
Appellants admit that had the heart

disease first manifested itself some seven months
after the fall as set out by the Court in the Majority
Opinion, that the casual relationship between the fall
and the heart disease would be open to more serious
question, but when the heart disease first manifested
itself immediately after the fall and had never existed
prior to the fall, it is obvious that the two were connected.

Throughout the history of this case from
-3-

the time of the fall until McWilliams' death, the State
Insurance Fund never raised the question as to whether
heart disability was connected with the fall and consistently furnished medical treatment for McWilliams'
heart condition, even to the extent of the installation
of the pacemaker.

It would appear that the defendant

had, for a period of many months, acknowledged responsibility for the heart condition and would be estopped following McWilliams' death from denying such
responsibility, particularly where the appellants are
at a decided disadvantage in not being able to have
available to them McWilliams' testimony as to his physical condition throughout his lifetime.

The crux of

this case is whether the Industrial Accident Commission can ignore the proven facts that McWilliams had no
pre-existing heart condition and adopt medical opinion
based upon speculation without factual support.

We

refer the Court to the recent case of Baker v Industrial Commission, 405 P 2d 613, where the Court
stated as follows:
"This court is committed to the rule
that as a matter of law the commission
may n9t, without any reason or cause,
arbitrarily and capriciously refuse to
believe and act upon substantial, competent and credible evidence which is
uncontradicted.
"If knowledge of the cause of an ailment,
-4-

to be shown by the applicant, is a
condition precedent to an award in
every case, the letter and spirit of
the act become quite uninspiring.
"The dissent says that the critical question here is whether the injury occurred
in the course of applicant's employment.
We think the critical question here is
whether the commission arbitrarily can
dis count all competent, uncontradicted
evidence. We think it can't but did so
here, calling for a reversal."
As the dissenting opinion noted the medical
testimony offered was purely conjectural on the issue
of a pre-existing heart ailment.

It is a grave injus-

tice under the facts and law of this case for this court
to stamp approval on the Commission's finding of a
pre-existing heart condition, and deny the decedents
widow and her four children compensation when there
is not one substantial bit of evidence with which it can
be supported.
The decedent suffered a violent blow to the head
when he fell to the pavement on July 22, 1964.

Much

of the controversey between the medical witness for
the parties involved dealt with whether damage to the
brain could effect the heart system.

Appellants' wit-

nesses maintained such a blow could have positive illeffect on the heart function.
Neither appellants nor her counsel are med-5-

ically trained.

We and the commission as well are

dependent on the advise of the medical trained.

In

this connection, admitting that it is contrary to convention, we call the courts attention to a recent news
release regarding the tragic assassination of Senator
Robert F. Kennedy. In a diagnostic repcrt upon the
probable effects of Senator Kennedy's bullet wounds
to the inner brain, should he have survived, the American Press on June 6, 1968, published the following
quotation from the eminent neurosurgeons, Henry
Cuneo. and Lawrence Pool, the men who operated.
"There was evidently serious damage
to the cerebellum, the part of the brain
on the extreme back of head, on the right
side; also to part of the right cerebal hemisphere, and also the mid-brain, which
is the main cable connecting the brain itself with all the rest of the body.
"This mid-brain deals with not only the
function of motion in the arms and legs
and sensation to the body but also with
eye movements and even the life function
itself, such as blood pressure, breathing, heart-rate.
"So, it's a very critical area, and this was
injured, and this is why I fear- -as Dr.
Cuneo indicated--the outcome may be extremeJy tragic." (Emphasis added)
Nicholson v Industrial Commission, 15 Utah
2d 176, 389 Pac 2d 730.
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"In Jones v. California Packing Corporation, 244 Pac 2d 640, this court recognized the fact that it will not disturb the
finding or order of the Commission if
they are supported by any substantial
evidence. However, it is also recognized the duty of this court, particularly with
reference to a denial of compensation to
determine whether the commission had
arbitrarily disregarded competent evidence
in favor of unsubstantial contradictory
evidence."
POINT III
THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE OF
RES JUDICATA.
The Court has entirely ignored the issue of
res judicata and estoppel, and we reiterate our position as set out beginning on Page 32 of the Brief previously filed herein.

In this connection we wish to

point out to the Court that the appellants herein have
been prejudiced by the position taken by defendant in
not denying liability for the heart condition during the
time when McWilliams was alive and could have presented evidence on his own behalf as to the condition
of his health preceding the fall and could have sought
medical examination and research to determine the
exact cause of the malfunction.

The defendant assum-

ed the responsibility of payment for treatment of McWilliams including the heart condition up to the time

-7-

of the installation of the pacemaker which immediately
preceded his death, and it is obvious that McWilliams'
could only have concluded that the defendant acknowledged the heart condition as being an incident of the
industrial accident.

Under these circumstances,

McWilliams obviously was lulled into a sense of security concerning defendant's responsibility for the
heart condition.

Under these circumstances the in-

surance carrier and employer are estopped to deny
liability.
Vass' Case, 65 N. E. 2d 549
"The policy of Workmen's Compensation
Jurisprudence is not to discourage the
voluntary payment of compensation and
medical expenses on the part of an injured
workman.
For this reason, the payment
by the employer and his insurance carrier
in itself does not preclude them from denying liability on the basis of coverage under
the policy or causation.
If, however, by continuing the compensation and medical payments for a period
of time and workman and his dependents
are lulled into a sense of security and
there has been a change of position and
their rights are prejudiced, the employer
and his carrier may be estopped in a subsequent proceeding to deny liability."
Harding vs. Industrial Commission of Utah,
28 Pac. 2d 183.
On the question of estoppel the Court said:
"Ordinarily in the absence of prejudice

-8-

to the employee or facts giving rise to
an estoppel, an insurance carrier may,
notwithstanding voluntary payment of compensation, the furnishing of hospital or
medical care, the entry of appearance, or
statement made that the policy covered
the employee, ·urge the defense that the
employee did not meet with an accident, or
that the policy did not cover the employment, or that there was no causal connection between the injury and disability.
(Cases cited). It however, cannot by its
conduct in paying compensation over a long
period of time and after either full investigation or opportunity and time for such
inquiry, and after the claimant's position
has changed and rights to which he was
entitled are lost by lapse of time, and the
running of statutes of limitations , then
interpose the defense that the policy of
insurance did not cover the employee.

****

The circumstances are such that the
State Insurance Fund is now estopped to
urge that the employee was not within the
protection of the policy * * * *. "
With respect to our Brief previously filed in
this case, we wish to correct the following citations:
On page 34 of the Brief:
The correct citation for Hughes Motor Co. v
Thomas is 299 Pacific 176
The citation previously 101 C. J. S., Workman's
Comp., Section 835, should be 99 C.J.S. 203
On Page 35 of the Brief:
The citation previously given as 100 C. J. S. ,

-9-

Workman's Comp. Section 401, should be 99
C.J.S. 190.
POINT IV
THE COURT THE 2ND MEDICAL PANEL AND THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION BASED THEIR DECISION
IN PART ON THE OPINION OF A DISQUALIFIED
MEDICAL PANEL.
Appellants objected to Dr. Viko being part of
the original Medical Panel on this case for the reason
that he had been instrumental in recommending the
installation of the pacemaker which immediately preceded McWilliams' death.

While it was not emphasiz-

ed in the Brief previously submitted, it is obvious that
Dr. Viko might subconsciously lean in favor of the
party to whom he was looking for his compensation and
might, by virtue thereof, have had some influence on
other members of the initial Panel.

Also he had some

responsibility for recommending the treatment that
immediately preceded McWilliams death.

The second

medical panel and the Industrial Commission as well
as this court have all based their decision in part on
the opinions expressed by the disqualified panel.

The

1st panel report should never have been before the
2nd panel or·relied upon by them.
In conclusion, it is significant to note that none
of the doctors on either Medical Panel were able to
offer any explanation for McWilliams' heart condition
-10-

other than the purely speculative one that he must
have had a pre-existing condition.

This speculative

conclusion ignores the abundance of evidence in the
record negating this conclusion.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERTS & POOLE
THERON E. ROBERTS
111 Broadway
Boise, Idaho
Attorneys for Appellants.
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